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Forecasts of macroeconomic variables as the inﬂation rate serve as impor-
tant guidelines for the private as well as the public sector. At least central
banks that adopted an inﬂation targeting regime are in urgent need of high
quality inﬂation forecasts. Accurate inﬂation forecasts are also needed within
private sector wage negotiations. In this paper we present a new method to
predict future inﬂation via conducting electronic markets. We show at the
example of a prototype market how the market data of such an experimental
market can be used to generate predictions of the future inﬂation rate. We
also show that the market data provide important evidence on the distribu-
tion of inﬂation expectations.
Keywords: Inﬂation Forcasting, Inﬂation Targeting, Electronic Markets
JEL-Classiﬁcation: C93, E37
¤I would like to thank Forrest Nelson, Joyce Berg and the Iowa Electronic Markets team for
their great support in planning and conducting the market. I am also grateful for comments from
Forrest Nelson on an earlier version of this paper
yDr. rer. pol. Michael Berlemann, Chair for Economics, esp. Money, Credit and Currency,
Faculty of Business Management and Economics, Dresden University of Technology, D-01069
Dresden, Tel.: 0351-463-35904, E-mail: berleman@rcs.urz.tu-dresden.de
11 Introduction
Electronic market research started to evolve in the aftermath of a market experi-
ment set up by a group of researchers from the University of Iowa. On the occasion
of the 1988 presidential election in the United States they organized an electronic
market where shares on the candidates for presidentship were traded. This ﬁrst
political stock market proved to be highly successful in predicting the outcome of
the presidential election.1 Motivated by the good results the Iowa Electronic Mar-
kets (IEM) were founded to organize electronic markets regularly. Since 1988 IEM
organized a large number of markets, most of them on the occasion of political
elections.2 Altogether the markets were quite successful in predicting the electoral
outcome.3 Initiated and strongly supported by members of IEM, political stock
markets were also organized outside the U.S., for instance in Austria, Canada,
Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. Though the electoral sys-
tems and the political landscapes in these countries are somewhat more complex
than in the U.S. the most of these markets provided well forecasting results. A
recent meta study by Berlemann and Schmidt (2001) for 28 German political stock
markets showed that the on average the markets proved to be even more success-
ful in predicting the electoral outcome than the polls of public opinion research
institutes.
Political stock markets’ success in predicting political events made us believe
that it could be fruitful to think about transferring the idea of using electronic
markets as a forecasting device to genuine economic events. We argue that a well-
designed electronic market should also be able to provide some reasonable forecast
of macroeconomic variables. In this paper we focus on the question, how electronic
markets can be used to forecast future inﬂation. Using binary options, we develop
a prototype-market for forecasting inﬂation. We also present empirical results
from a recent pilot experiment with an inﬂation forecasting market and show how
the market reveals worthy information on future inﬂation and the probability of
diﬀerent inﬂation scenarios.
The paper is organized as follows: In the second section we deal with the
question why forecasting inﬂation is an important issue. The third section brieﬂy
reviews conventional methods of forecasting inﬂation. In section 4 the basic de-
sign of an inﬂation forecast market is developed. We also show why we expect
this market to produce some high quality inﬂation forecast in this section. Sec-
1For a description of the 1988 presidential stock market compare Forsythe et al. (1992).
2For an overview on the political stock markets organized by IEM compare Berg et al. (1997).
More information on IEM is provided on the IEM-Homepage: http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem.
3It should be noted that the main objective of electronic market research was to ,,produce”
market data in an at least somewhat controlled environment to analyze aspects like individual
market behavior, information aggregation within markets or informational eﬃciency of markets.
In the beginning of electronic market research forecasts were only some kind of by-product of
conducting markets. Even if the data from the markets we propose can be used study market
behavior, too, we will solely focus on the forecasting aspect in this paper.
2tion 5 presents empirical results from a recent pilot experiment with an inﬂation
forecasting market. In section 6 we show some further evaluations of the market
data under the assumption of normally distributed expectations. In section 7 we
compare the electronic markets system with conventional forecasting methods and
discuss unresolved questions and possible further extensions. Section 8 summarizes
the main results and gives a short outlook on future research ideas.
2 Why bother with future inﬂation?
The starting point of the following expositions is the question, why people care
about future inﬂation or - at least - why they should care about it. Inﬂation,
deﬁned as permanent increases of the aggregate price level, is typically supposed
to cause several eﬀects that might positively or negatively inﬂuence personal and
social welfare. The reason why the goal of a stable price level is a major objective
of economic policy all around the world is that the negative distributional and
allocative eﬀects of (expected and unexpected) inﬂation are typically supposed to
dominate the positive ones.4
Nowadays, in the most countries the central banks are concerned with the goal
of guaranteeing stable prices. In order to so, an increasing number of central
banks have adopted a so-called ,,inﬂation targeting regime” during the last decade.
Inﬂation targeting is a framework for monetary policy that is characterized by
announcing an explicit oﬃcial target or at least a target range for the inﬂation rate
for some predeﬁned period of time. In an inﬂation targeting framework there is a
strong commitment of the monetary authority to concentrate on holding inﬂation
within the target range as the primary goal of monetary policy. An important
element of such a strategy is a high degree of transparency with respect to the
central bank’s objectives as well as to the undertaken actions to fulﬁll them. Since
monetary policy aﬀects the inﬂation rate with a lag of some 18-24 months, monetary
policy has to be forward looking. Svensson (1997) showed that the implementation
of an inﬂation targeting regime for monetary policy implies to use the inﬂation
forecast as intermediate target in a way that monetary policy should be tightened
when actual inﬂation expectations exceed the target level and the other way round.
Even if a monetary authority follows a diﬀerent monetary policy strategy but still
primarily tries to guarantee stable prices it often uses inﬂation expectations as an
important indicator, at least with respect to the credibility of its monetary policy
strategy. Whenever a central bank that is committed to low inﬂation observes
high inﬂation expectations, the actual monetary strategy seems not to be highly
credible. A central bank might take this as a signal to think over the actual policy
strategy.
Even if central banks in industrial countries were quite successful in ﬁghting in-
ﬂation within the last decade, inﬂation was not eliminated at all. There is even no
4Sill (1999), p. 5.
3guarantee that the actually low levels of inﬂation will last within the future. Thus
also private institutions are interested in future inﬂation to anticipate expected
changes in the aggregate price level in order to prevent negative distributional
eﬀects of unexpected inﬂation. Banks carry an interest in anticipating future in-
ﬂation in credit contracts. Labor unions try to anticipate future inﬂation during
the wage negotiations to prevent their members from suﬀering unexpected losses
in real wages etc.
Last but not least researchers are interested in the way how people make indi-
vidual forecasts on macroeconomic variables like inﬂation. Empirical data on this
aspect are worthy to test diﬀerent hypotheses on the formation of expectations
thereby providing evidence how to model the private sector in macroeconomic
models.
Altogether we may conclude that governmental as well as private institutions
are in urgent need of forecasts of future inﬂation. In fact, by far the most central
banks care very much about future inﬂation and often invest a lot of resources into
forecasting activities. The same is true for private banks and ﬁrms.
3 Conventional forecasting methods
There are two basic concepts of dealing with the problem of forecasting future inﬂa-
tion. The ﬁrst concept, we will call it the ,,econometric approach” in the following,
tries to generate forecasts on the basis of actual and historical empirical data us-
ing econometric techniques. The basic idea of this approach is that there is some
theoretical model explaining by which factors inﬂation is determined. Whenever
we believe to know, which is the correct model and we have the necessary data
at hand we should be able to produce some reasonable forecast of future inﬂation.
The second concept of forecasting inﬂation, we will call it ,,expectations approach”,
does not care about the question which is the appropriate theory allowing to pre-
dict future inﬂation. The expectations approach simply suggests that a certain
subgroup of people, caring about future inﬂation, knows enough about the true
determinants of price level changes to be able to predict future inﬂation well on
average. Thus it is suﬃcient to measure the inﬂation expectations of an informed
subgroup without knowing which methods are used for the individual forecasts.
It is easy to imagine that both, the econometric and the approaches of measuring
inﬂation expectations are themselves quite heterogeneous. In the following we will
give a brief overview on the typically used methods.
3.1 The econometric approach
When using econometric methods for forecasting purposes we typically start out
from some theoretical model how the economy works. It is out of the question that
an economy is an extremely complex and highly dynamic system. On the one hand
4the model should capture as many important relationships between the relevant
macroeconomic variables as possible to be successful in forecasting. On the other
hand a growing complexity of the model typically increases the problems to handle
it and to use econometric forecasting methods. In the end the problem to solve
typically is to determine which econometric model allows to reach a given average
forecasting success by the lowest eﬀort.
As it was argued earlier in this paper, most central banks are in urgent need of
precise inﬂation forecasts. Thus it is no surprise that central banks typically invest
a lot of resources into forecasting activities. Most central banks use highly complex
macroeconometric core-models that sometimes consist of more than a hundred of
equations. While the basic inﬂation forecasting concepts of the central banks are
typically well documented,5 it is often hard to get detailed information on how the
forecasts are done.6 In any case the models are far too complex to be reviewed at
length in this paper.
The basic problem with purely econometric models is that they try to estimate
future inﬂation via past observations of inﬂation itself and other realizations of
macroeconomic variables. These models are backward-looking thereby neglecting
the Lucas-Critique. It is easy to understand that such models will hardly be able
to predict changes in inﬂation expectations that have to do with news like an-
nouncements of future policy changes, at least in the long run.7 It is also hard to
say something about the probability of diﬀerent inﬂation scenarios on the basis of
these models.
Even if the used forecasting models diﬀer quite heavily from case to case, some
regularities can be observed. Most central banks do not rely on a single econometric
inﬂation forecasting model. Often the core-model is supplemented by less complex
models to generate forecasts for exogenous variables, to adjust the core model for
short-term disequilibria or to simply control for the plausibility of the core-model’s
predictions. The Bank of England as well as the Federal Reserve Bank use - among
others - Phillips curve models for this purpose.8 Even if central banks invest a lot
of resources into econometric forecasting models they often do not completely rely
on these models’ forecasts. George (1999, p. V), the Bank of England’s Governor,
states in this respect:
The Bank’s use of economic models is pragmatic and pluralist. In
an ever-changing economy, no single model can possibly assimilate in
5Compare e.g. Poloz, Rose and Tetlow (1994) for the Bank of Canada’s, Goodhart (2001) for
the Bank of England’s, Cassino et al. (1997) and Drew and Hunt (1998) for the Bank of New
Zealand’s, Jansson and Vredin (2001) for the Swedish Riksbank’s and Brayton et al. (1997) for
the Federal Reserve Bank’s forecasting system.
6An exception is the detailed report on the Bank of England’s forecasting system (Bank of
England (1999)).
7Ragan (1995), p. 4
8Compare Bank of England (1999), p. 77-92 or Stock and Watson (1999) for a description of
Phillips curve models.
5a comprehensive way all the factors that matter for policy. Forming
judgements about those factors, and their implications for policy, is the
job of the Committee, not something that can be abdicated to models
or even to modelers. But economic models are indispensable tools in
that process.”
Thus individual beliefs and judgments often play an important role even in inﬂation
forecasts that are based upon econometric models.
Since the inﬂation forecasts from econometric models of central banks are often
not published,9 it is hard to judge the quality of this type of forecasts. Even if
the forecasts are publicly announced, often the time-series are too short to assess
the forecast’s quality empirically. In a recent study Atkeson and Ohanian (2001)
analyzed in how far diﬀerent types of Phillips curve models, as they are used by the
Federal Reserve Bank or the Bank of England, are useful for forecasting inﬂation.
Using U.S.-data they show that the predictions of these models were worse than
simply assuming that inﬂation will be the same over the next year as it has been over
the last year. Interestingly enough, Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) also found that
even the Federal Reserve Bank’s inﬂation forecasts, published in the Greenbook,
proved not to be better than the naive forecast that everything stays the same in
the future.
3.2 The expectations approach
As it was described earlier, the expectations approach does not care about the
question which is the appropriate model of the economy. The basic idea of the
expectations approach is that many people care - or at least should care - about
inﬂation. Since inﬂation directly decreases purchasing power of all monetary assets,
people owning or intending to buy these assets will make individual predictions
on future inﬂation. The individual beliefs on future changes in the price level
might diﬀer heavily because of heterogenous information sets and diﬀerent ways
of interpreting them (i.e. individuals might use diﬀerent theoretical ,,models” for
their forecasts). If individual expectations are formed rationally they should be a
good predictor for future inﬂation. Thus the basic question to be answered is how
to measure inﬂation expectations.
Again there are two basic concepts how to solve the problem of measuring in-
ﬂation expectations: conducting inﬂation expectation surveys or deriving inﬂation
expectations from ﬁnancial market data. In the following we will brieﬂy describe
both approaches.
9The Bank of England publishes its inﬂation forecasts within the regular inﬂation reports.
Nevertheless the mean inﬂation forecast is somewhat hard to assess because the forecasts are
presented in the form of so-called fan-charts. Somewhat surprising neither the empirical data
underlying this fan-chart nor the mean inﬂation forecast is provided numerically. The Federal
Reserve Bank treats its own inﬂation forecasts as conﬁdential and therefore publishes them with
a lag of ﬁve (!) years in the so-called Greenbook.
63.2.1 Inﬂation expectation surveys
The most direct way to assess inﬂation expectations is to conduct qualitative or
quantitative inﬂation expectation surveys.
The most commonly applied qualitative survey method is the so-called ,,net
balance statistic”. In these surveys the respondents have to guess whether inﬂation
will ,,go up”, ,,stay the same” or ,,go down” within a certain period of time. In
its simplest form the net balance value is then obtained by simply subtracting the
proportion of respondents that supposed the inﬂation rate to decrease from the one
that predicted increasing inﬂation.10
In direct quantitative surveys the respondents have to state numerical values for
expected inﬂation.11 The results then have to be aggregated by some procedure.
Typically the answers of the respondents are weighted equally to calculate the
mean inﬂation expectation. Often quantitative surveys are conducted separately
for diﬀerent groups in society, e.g. households, manufacturers or professional fore-
casters.12
In a expert’s report on the measurement of inﬂation expectations, made out
on the occasion of the recent adoption of an inﬂation targeting regime in South
Africa, Laubscher and Schombee (1999) evaluated experiences of 6 inﬂation target-
ing countries and the United States with diﬀerent inﬂation expectations surveys.
Their main results can be summarized as follows:
² Direct quantitative inﬂation expectation surveys typically perform better
than qualitative surveys. The net balance statistics creates somewhat er-
ratic forecasts correlating poorly with real inﬂation. In addition to that net
balance statistics turned out to be biased downwards in times of high inﬂation
and high uncertainty and vice versa.
² The best results with respect to predicting core inﬂation and future nominal
wage growth can be obtained by household- and consumer surveys while the
results of surveys of professional forecasters and economists perform better
in predicting future interest rate movements.
Nevertheless there are various unresolved problems with quantitative inﬂation ex-
pectation surveys due to the typical survey errors:
10For a more detailed discussion of the net balance statistics compare Batchelor (1986) and
Foster and Gregory (1977).
11Prominent examples for quantitative inﬂation expectations surveys are the Livingston Survey
and the Survey of Professional Forecasters, conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia.
12In an analysis for US-data Gramlich (1986) found the surprising result that the quantitative
expectation surveys of consumers, namely the University of Michigan ISR consumer survey, per-
formed signiﬁcantly better than the Livingston survey of professional forecasters in forecasting
future inﬂation. Similar results were found by Roberts (1998). In addition to that the lower
educated and poorer consumers performed better in forecasting inﬂation than those of the higer
educated and richer consumers on average. Thus diﬀerent groups in society seem to have diﬀerent
levels of information or at least do react diﬀerently on certain types of information.
7² There is an urgent need of having a representative sample to reduce sampling
errors. It is a long known fact that such a sample is hard to obtain. As
Laubscher and Schombee (1999, p. 16) report, the response rates in inﬂation
expectation surveys are generally low (25 up to 35%). This makes it nearly
impossible to obtain a representative sample.
² The questions the respondents have to answer within the survey have to be
formulated very carefully to avoid answering biases. The same is true for the
used questioning technique. Especially the often used telephone surveys are
prone to diﬀerent sorts of biases.
² The timing of inﬂation expectation surveys is extremely important. All re-
spondents should be asked within a short period of time to ascertain that the
basic information set is the same.
² One of the most important problems is that the respondent typically have
no incentive to reveal their true expectations. Often the respondents are
rewarded ﬁnancially for answering and thus have a strong incentive to take
part in the survey even if they have no information on future inﬂation at all
or do not care about the topic. In addition to that the interviewers might
motivate uninformed respondents to answer nevertheless because they are
paid per interview and typically are interested in minimizing their transaction
costs.
² Given that the survey typically includes a good number of very poor in-
formed respondents it seems to be somewhat questionable to attach the same
weight to each individual interview. This aggregation problem can hardly be
solved because the level of information of a respondent can not be measured
objectively.
Thus there are several theoretical arguments explaining why inﬂation expectation
surveys do not predict future inﬂation very accurately.
3.2.2 Gauging inﬂation expectations from ﬁnancial market data
Two major problems of the direct approach of measuring inﬂation expectations
are, as pointed out earlier, that the interviewed people have no incentive to reveal
their true expectations and the aggregation problem. Both problems can be solved
by means of gauging inﬂation expectations from ﬁnancial market data. According
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inﬂation expectations at time t with respect to time m, denoted by Et[¼m
t ], af-
fect nominal interest rates i. The basic problem to solve when using the Fisher
8equation to extract inﬂation expectations from ﬁnancial market data is how to get
information on the corresponding real interest rate r.
Inﬂation expectations are easy to extract from market data when there is a well-
functioning market for real (indexed) bonds. In that case we can simply subtract
the real interest rate from the nominal interest rate of equal-maturity bonds to
obtain inﬂation expectations.13 Since there are only a few countries with markets
for indexed bonds this method can rarely be used.
If there is no market for indexed bonds it is possible to gauge inﬂation expec-
tations from the term structure of (nominal) interest rates on government bonds14
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Under the assumption of rationally formed expectations the expectation errors are
zero on average. If we further assume that the real interest rate is not chang-
ing between time n and m or we at least know on how much it is assumed to
change within this period, we are able to calculate the ﬁnancial market’s inﬂation
forecast.15
Altogether the empirical results on the predictive quality of the above described
method are not very promising. While Mishkin (1990,1991) and Estrella and
Mishkin (1997) found at least long term forecasts to be somewhat reliable, Jochum
and Kirchg¨ assner (1999) show that even these results do not hold when taking
non-stationarity of at least some of the data into account.
3.3 Conclusions
It was shown that all described methods of forecasting inﬂation have their advan-
tages and their drawbacks. Thus it is not surprising that none of them dominates
in the practice of forecasting. Most central banks rely on a mixture of the concepts
and often decide somewhat discretionary on the appropriate forecast. We might
13Compare Deacon and Derry (1994) or Svensson (1994).
14Governmental bonds are used because they are assumed to have the lowest degree of default
risk, thereby assuring that the nominal interest rates contain no risk premium
15For an overview on more advanced methods to extract inﬂation forecasts from ﬁnancial in-
struments compare e.g. S¨ oderlind and Svensson (1997).
9interpret this as some kind of distrust in conventional forecasting methods. Thus
further research in methods of measuring future inﬂation seems to be useful and
necessary.
4 The design of an electronic inﬂation forecasting
market
In the face of the fact that conventional methods of forecasting did not prove to be
highly reliable in predicting future inﬂation, yet, it might be useful to think about
alternative forecasting methods. Our proposal is to use well-designed electronic
markets for this purpose. The forecasting system we propose is some kind of
combination of the two expectation approaches (expectation surveys, use of market
data) we already discussed.
Principally, electronic market research belongs to the ﬁeld of experimental eco-
nomics. An electronic market is a virtual market where shares on certain events are
traded. Typically electronic markets are organized via internet and on the basis of
real-money transactions. In the following we will show how an electronic market
can be designed to forecast future inﬂation at the example of a recently conducted
prototype market.
4.1 Market admittance
Electronic markets are fully computerized markets. To be able to take part in such
a market, participants have to register for admittance via internet, ﬁrst. Besides
providing some personal data during the process of registration, participants have
to decide on their personal initial investments. Typically investments are somewhat
restricted due to legislative restrictions. In the prototype market the minimum
investment was 10 Euro and the maximum investment was 500 Euro. The initial
investments have to be covered by the traders. All transactions in the market are
based on real money. Each participant can win or loose money in the market,
depending on his or her success in trading.
As soon as the initial investment has been transferred to the market organizer
(typically this is done via cash or bank transfer to a market account) the participant
gets a trader-ID and a password to login the market. In addition to that a trader
account for the participant is created and his initial investment is transferred to
the account.
Technical precondition for taking part in an electronic market is an internet con-
nection. Even if there were no formal restrictions for participation in the prototype
market the most traders were students of economics and business administration
at Dresden University of Technology. The market was presented within two univer-
sity courses on monetary economics16 and was announced in some other university
16The students in these two courses got an extra endowment of 5 Euro when investing at least
10courses.
4.2 Market setup
Within the prototype market certain types of future contracts were traded. The
complete set of contracts that was traded in the market and the contracts’ payoﬀ
structure is shown in table 1.









Table 1: Traded contracts
Initially there were eight types of contracts in the market. The ultimate value
of these contracts depended on the realization of the German year-to-year inﬂation
rate in February 2001 (I), as announced by Statisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden on
10th March 2001. The payoﬀ, a certain type of contract generated on the liquida-
tion day, was 1 Euro if the German inﬂation rate for February 2001 turned out to
fall into the interval, the contract was denominated to, and 0 Euro otherwise. Thus
we deal with so-called ,,simplex-options”. To illustrate the liquidation procedure
assume that the inﬂation rate turns out to be 1,8%. In this case all ”I 1,5-2,0”-
contracts are worth 1 Euro and all other contracts are worth nothing. Markets
where simplex options are traded are called ,,winner-takes-all-markets”.
On November 22, the contract ”I 2,0-2,5” was split into two contracts ”I 2,0-
2,25” and ”I 2,25-2,5”. Therefore, each participant who held former ”I 2,0-2,5”-
contracts in his portfolio was endowed with the same number of the two new
contracts. Thus the expected worth of the participants’ portfolios was not changed
by the contract split. The contract split was done because it was observed that the
former ”I 2,0-2,5”-contract had been traded for quite high prices, thus indicating
that the participants attached a high probability to the event that the inﬂation
rate would have been in between 2 and 2,5%. To be able to forecast the inﬂation
rate more accurately, the former contract ”I 2,0-2,5” was divided into two new
contracts covering the same interval.
ten Euro on their own as an additional incentive to take part in the market. It should also
be noted that the students had to answer some questions on electronic markets in their ﬁnal
examination. This surely increased their interest in taking part.
114.3 Market liquidation
The prototype market was liquidated soon after the German inﬂation rate for
February 2001 was announced on March 10. This was done by the following two-
step procedure:
1. Each participant got back the money he held on his market account in the
end of the market.
2. Each participant got the liquidation value of the portfolio of contracts, he
held in the end of the market.
To illustrate the liquidation procedure we shall give an example of an imaginary
participant X.
contract/asset number of contracts in liquidation value total value
portfolio of participant X per contract unit in Euro
I 0,0- 76 0 0
I 0,0-1,5 4 0 0
I 1,5-2,0 13 1 13
I 2,0-2,5 2 0 0
I 2,5-3,0 5 0 0
I 3,0-3,5 9 0 0
I 3,5-4,0 5 0 0
I 4,0+ 0 0 0
cash on account 3 - 3
total Payoﬀ - - 16
Table 2: Portfolio liquidation for an imaginary participant X under the assumption
that the inﬂation rate turned out to be 1,8%
Therefore we assume that the inﬂation rate turned out to be 1,8%. The second
column in table 2 shows the individual portfolio of participant X and the third
column the liquidation values of the contracts. The total value of X’s portfolio
of contracts is 13 Euro. Adding the 3 Euro X is assumed to hold on his market
account he gets a total payoﬀ of 16 Euro.
4.4 Trading within the inﬂation market
The prototype market was open for transactions at any time during the market
period, i.e. from 9th October 2000 up to 15th March 2001. Upon entering the
market and any time thereafter until the market closed a participant could buy
unit portfolios (so-called ,,bundles”) from the market organizer for the price of
1 Euro. Each unit portfolio consisted of one of each type of contracts. Thus a
12bundle in the inﬂation market included 8 contracts initially and 9 contracts after
the contract split. Complete unit portfolios could also be sold back to the market
organizer during the market period for the price of 1 Euro each. Selling and buying
unit portfolios from or to the market organizer are primary market transactions.
Together with the already described market-liquidation procedure the pricing
of the unit portfolios guaranteed that the market is a zero-sum-game for the market
organizer. All initial investments were paid back to the participants. The market
was typically no zero sum game for the individual participant since he could win
or loose money, depending on his success in trading within the market.
To be able to realize proﬁts in the market, a participant had to trade within
the secondary market, i.e. he had to buy or sell contracts from or to other par-
ticipants.17 The secondary market was organized as a so-called ,,double-auction-
market”. The participants could issue oﬀers to buy (bids) or oﬀers to sell (asks)
contracts. When using the ﬁrst type of transactions, the so-called ,,limit orders”,
the traders had to choose the order type (bid or ask), the contract type (e.g. ”I 0,0-
1,5”), the number of contracts he wants to trade, the transaction price and ﬁnally
the expiration date of the order. Limit orders were maintained in separate bid and
ask queues ordered ﬁrst by oﬀer price and then by the time of issuance. Whenever
an oﬀer entered one of the queues it remained there until the oﬀer turned out to be
unfeasible (e.g. because of a lack of liquidity to realize a buying transaction), was
withdrawn by the trader, reached its expiration date or was carried out. Orders
were carried out whenever bid- and ask-prices overlapped.
The market software provided several facilities for the traders to obtain infor-
mation on the market. On the one hand the trader got personal information about
his market account, current portfolio and the orders he submitted. On the other
hand there was information about the highest bids to buy and lowest asks to sell
for each traded contract type. Similar to real stock markets the trader obtained
no information on how much contracts he would have been able to buy or sell at
actual prices. He could only be sure to be able to sell or buy at least one contract
at actual prices. To do so the traders could use the second type of transaction, the
so-called ,,market orders”. Market orders were always carried out immediately at
current prices. Thus the trader had only to specify the contract type, the order
type (bid or ask) and the number of contracts he wants to trade in this case.
Finally we should note that, diﬀerent from real stock markets, short sales and
purchases on margin were disallowed to secure the zero sum-game character of the
market.
Before we turn to the results of the inﬂation market, we will discuss which
basic trading strategies are possible. Principally we might think of the following
four types of possible strategies that might be combined in several ways:
1. the arbitrage strategy,
17For a more detailed description of the trading system of the Iowa Electronic Markets-software
compare Forsythe et al. (1991), pp. 74-78.
132. the expectations strategy,
3. the risk-adjusted expectations strategy and
4. the speculative strategy.
The arbitrage strategy focuses on realizing risk-free proﬁts. Arbitrage operations
are possible in the inﬂation market whenever the sum of all actual bids to buy is
above 1 Euro or the sum of all asks to sell is below 1 Euro. In the ﬁrst case a trader
can buy a unit portfolio from the market organizer at the price of 1 Euro and sell
it immediately at current prices within the secondary market. In the latter case a
trader can buy a unit portfolio at current prices on the secondary market and sell
it on the primary market at the price of 1 Euro. In both cases he earns a risk-free
proﬁt.18
The second strategy, the expectations strategy, requires to build some expecta-
tion on the realization of the event that is determining the ﬁnal liquidation values
of the contracts. In its simplest form the trader starts out from the assumption
that his expectation will coincide with the realization of the event. In this case he
will buy only those contracts, he assesses to be undervalued by the market, and
sell all contracts he supposes to be overvalued.
A third strategy is some kind of variation of the simple expectations strategy.
Following the risk adjusted expectations strategy requires to take into account
that the subjective expectations on the realization of the event might be wrong or
at least somewhat distorted. Similar to a trader following the simple expectations
strategy he will buy contracts he supposes to be heavily undervalued. But diﬀerent
from the simple strategy he will weigh up the possible proﬁts if his expectations
proof to be correct against the risk that they are wrong. Therefore ceteris paribus
a trader following the risk adjusted expectations strategy will sell a contract earlier
when prices rise than a trader following the simple expectations strategy.
Under the speculative strategy there is no need to know very much about the
,,true” realization of the event determining the liquidation values of the traded
contracts. Traders that are keen on speculative proﬁts are trying to make use of
short- or middle-term trends. Thus a speculative trader will hold a contract even
if he suggests that is already overvalued as long as he expects that prices will go
on rising. This strategy is quite risky because there is no guarantee for the trader
to be able to sell the contracts before the speculative bubble bursts.
18If we take a closer look at the situation, the described arbitrage strategy is not totally risk-
free because of the risk that during the arbitrage transactions someone may withdraw his order.
If we take into account that realizing arbitrage transactions do take only a few seconds of time,
this risk is very small and thus can be neglected.
145 Results from the prototype market
5.1 Basic market data and properties of the prototype mar-
ket
5.1.1 Initial investments and ﬁnal payoﬀs
Before we present the forecasting results of the prototype market we should sum-
marize some basic market data and properties. The total number of participants
was 44 and most of them were students at Dresden University of Technology. The
total amount of money invested was 1021,62 Euro. Thus the average initial invest-
ment was some 23,22 Euro. In comparison to so-called ,,vote-share-markets”19 the
chances to win or loose money are quite high in winner-takes-all-markets because
only one type of contract has a positive liquidation value. Thus the distribution of
payoﬀs typically diﬀers quite heavily from the one of initial investments. In ﬁgure





























Cumulativeinitial investments Cumulativefinal payoffs Equal distribution
Figure 1: Reallocation of initial investments
We see that initial investments diﬀered quite heavily from trader to trader,
19Vote-share-markets are often used in forecasting political events like elections. In such markets
the liquidation value of a contract depends on the percentage of votes, the party, the contract is
denominated to, got in an election. Thus typically each contract has a positive liquidation value
in a vote-share-market.
15resulting in a Gini-coeﬃcient of 0,29.20 After the market was closed, the inequality
of the traders’ wealth increased heavily to a Gini-coeﬃcient of 0,57. Thus the
traders’ success in trading was somewhat diﬀerent. The distribution of the rates































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































i=1 xi , where n is the number
of observations and xi is the value of observation i .
165.1.2 Market activity
The ﬁrst transactions in the prototype market were done on 25th October 2000,
i.e. about two weeks after opening up the market. This is due to the fact that
the university courses and market advertising started in mid of October. That is
why we will focus on the period from 25th October up to 12 March 2001 in the
following expositions.
There was activity in the market during the whole market period with only two
short periods of very low activity. The ﬁrst period of low activity (20th December
2000 up to 8 January 2001) was due to christmas holidays. The second one (the
week from 9 February up to 16th February 2001) started in the end of the winter
term at Dresden University of Technology.
Market activity can be measured in terms of the daily traded contract volume
as well as the daily turnover in the inﬂation market. In ﬁgure 3 the daily traded
contract volume is shown. It is easy to see that market activity was signiﬁcantly
higher in the period from 25th October up to 20th December 2000 as in the period
after christmas holidays. The same is true for the daily turnover in the inﬂation
market (compare ﬁgure 4).
We suppose that the observed pattern is somewhat typical since - as the event
to be forecasted is getting closer - the degree of dispersion in the individual fore-
casts should diminish. Thus, the possibilities to organize proﬁtable trades slightly
decrease in the course of time.21
21There are several additional reasons that might have contributed to the decreasing market
activity. An additional explanation for the observed pattern might be that it was initially intended
to close the market in late December. The decision to prolong the market was made only a short
time before, as well as the announcement to do so. A second explanation might be that at least
some of the traders lost interest in trading in the market because the novelty eﬀect of trading
within the market (compare Forsythe et al. (1991), p. 78) diminished in the course of time. A
possible third explanation is that activity decreased because an increasing number of traders went
out of cash but were neither willing to sell contracts at current market prices nor to increase their
investment in the market. The fact that the winter term at Dresden University of Technology
ended in the beginning of February and the students had to prepare for their ﬁnal examinations
































































































































85.2 The mean market inﬂation forecast
As it was already pointed out earlier, the main objective of conducting the inﬂation
market was to produce some high quality inﬂation forecast at low costs. The basic
idea is to use the market prices, we observed in the inﬂation market, to forecast
inﬂation. Before turning to the concrete results we shall ﬁrst discuss, why and how
the market data can be used to forecast inﬂation.
To understand why the market should be able to produce some good inﬂation
forecast we can use the ﬁction of a highly informed trader. Let us assume that
this trader knows the ,,fundamental inﬂation rate” that would be realized if no
shocks occur. Ex ante he can not observe inﬂation shocks perfectly but he has
perfect information on the distribution of the shocks. For simplicity let us assume
the following concrete situation: the trader knows that the fundamental inﬂation
rate is 1,8% and that there is a shock that might push inﬂation up to 2,3% with
probability 0,2 or up to 2,6% with probability 0,1%. The fair prices for the contracts










Table 3: Example for fair priced contracts in the inﬂation market
Such a trader would buy all ”I 1,5-2,0”-contracts at prices below 0.7 Euro and
sell these contracts at prices above 0.7 Euro, thereby ﬁxing the market price to 0.7
Euro. Similarly he would ﬁx the prices of the other contracts to their fair prices.
In reality we have to take into account that there might be no highly informed
traders. Nevertheless we should expect that all relevant information within the
market is revealed by the market prices in the course of time. We should also
expect that the quality of the market forecast depends on the traders’ strategies.
Forecast quality can be supposed to increase with an increasing number of traders
making use of the earlier described arbitrage strategy22 and the expectations strat-
egy. Principally, it is somewhat unclear how forecast quality should be correlated to
the number of speculative transactions. On the one hand speculative transactions
that are motivated by ,,normal backwardation” or informational asymmetries are
22The argument is somewhat similar to the so-called ,,marginal-trader-hypothesis” discussed
in Forsythe et al. (1992), p. 1157 and Br¨ uggelambert (1996).
19likely to increase market eﬃciency. On the other hand speculative behaviour might
cause so-called ,,speculative bubbles” that are characterized by non-fundamental
prices. Such bubbles can occur when prices depend implicitly on expected prices.23
The daily mean inﬂation forecast was calculated by a normalization of each
days’ last traded prices as shown in table 4 at the example of data from 3rd De-
cember 2000. The normalized prices can be interpreted as the market’s valuation
of the probability that the inﬂation rate is going to fall into the referring interval.
Multiplying this probability with class middles (respective the bounds of the low-
est and the highest interval) and adding up for all traded contracts gives the daily
mean inﬂation forecast (in this case 2,26%).
Contract Last traded price Normalized price Class middle
name (pt) (pn
t ) resp. bound (m) pn
t ¢ m
I 0,0- 0,001 0,001 0 0,00000
I 0,0-1,5 0,025 0,025 0,750 0,01875
I 1,5-2,0 0,130 0,129 1,750 0,22575
I 2,0-2,25 0,340 0,338 2,125 0,71825
I 2,25-2,5 0,308 0,306 2,375 0,72675
I 2,5-3,0 0,171 0,170 2,750 0,46750
I 3,0-3,5 0,030 0,030 3,250 0,09750
I 3,5-4,0 0,001 0,001 3,750 0,00375
I 4,0+ 0,001 0,001 4 0,00400
P
1,007 1,000 - 2,26
Table 4: Calculation of the mean inﬂation forecast at the example of data for 3rd
December 2000
Diﬀerent from conventional inﬂation surveys we can obtain an actual inﬂation
forecast at any point in time during the market period. In ﬁgure ?? the daily mean
inﬂation forecast, based on last traded prices, is shown.
The mean inﬂation forecast was in between 2,0 and 2,5% within the whole
market period. Thus inﬂation expectations were relatively robust. One question
that is of major interest is, whether the market was able to forecast the February
2001 inﬂation rate for Germany in a satisfactory manner. To be able to answer
this question we calculated the absolute errors of the daily forecasts. From ﬁgure
6 it is easy to see that the market systematically underestimated the true inﬂation
rate that turned out to be 2,64% in February 2001. On average the mean inﬂation
forecast was some 0,45% below the true inﬂation rate. Principally, it should be
expected that the accuracy of the inﬂation forecast is increasing in the course of
time since the relevant event is getting closer, thereby lowering uncertainty about
the realization of the inﬂation rate. A look at ﬁgure 7 reveals that this hypothesis
















































market forecast last knowninflationrate
Figure 5: Mean inﬂation forecast for February 2001 and last known inﬂation rate
seems to be true for at least the last three months of the market. We will discuss
the prototype’s mean inﬂation forecast in section 7 in more detail.
Another interesting question is which kind of information was used to generate
the traders’ personal forecasts. Since by far the most of the traders in the inﬂation
market were students it might be supposed that professional forecasting methods
have hardly been applied. It seems to be reasonable to suppose that primarily
information supplied by newspapers and news services were used and especially the
current inﬂation rate, as announced by Statistisches Bundesamt played a decisive
role in expectations formation. If the traders believe that the actual inﬂation rate
is a proxy for future inﬂation we should observe that the market forecast shows a
tendency towards the last announced inﬂation rate.
In ﬁgure 5 we also plotted the market forecast against the last announced in-
ﬂation rate. On average, the market forecast was some 0,16% below the last an-
nounced inﬂation rate. A t-test reveals that this diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant.
Thus the traders did not only reproduce the observed inﬂation pattern. As it is
easy to see, the market forecast converged against the last announced inﬂation rate
























































































































25.3 Measuring uncertainty of the mean inﬂation forecast
By far the most published inﬂation forecasts are mean forecasts. Typically these
forecasts do not provide any information on the underlying probabilities of diﬀerent
inﬂation scenarios that generated a certain forecast. Since a certain mean inﬂation
forecast can result from diﬀerent distributions of individual predictions, information
on the distribution of the forecast is helpful in assessing the mean inﬂation forecast’s
uncertainty.
In inﬂation expectation surveys, often the variance across the individual fore-
casts is used as a proxy for the uncertainty surrounding a mean inﬂation forecast.
This is somewhat problematic since a high degree of dispersion in individual fore-
casts might also be due to forecasters’ heterogeneous sets of information. Thus
using the variance as a proxy for the mean inﬂation forecast might be mislead-
ing.24
Our prototype market allows to assess the mean inﬂation forecast’s uncertainty
directly. Since the normalized market prices pn
t;j can be interpreted as the market’s
aggregated evaluation of the probabilities of diﬀerent inﬂation scenarios, these prob-









t;j ¢ (mj ¡ ¹t)
2;
where J is the number of traded contract types, mj are the class middles (respective
bounds), ¹ is the mean inﬂation forecast and t is an index representing time. The
results are presented in ﬁgure 8. We observe that the variance of the daily mean
inﬂation forecast in the prototype market decreased sharply after a few days of trade
and ﬂuctuated around 0,25 thereafter. Within the last three months the variance
showed a somewhat decreasing tendency thereby indicating a slightly diminishing
degree of uncertainty.
24Bomberger (1996) showed at the example of U.S.-data for the period of 1946 up to 1994 that
disagreement in the Livingston inﬂation expectation survey is correlated with uncertainty derived
by ARCH-models. Nevertheless it is at least controversial whether disagreement in inﬂation





























































Figure 8: Variance of daily mean inﬂation forecast
6 Normally distributed forecasts and further ap-
plications
For each point in time during the market was open we can visualize the market’s
actual evaluation of the probability of diﬀerent inﬂation realizations in a histogram.
In ﬁgure 9 we show the empirical distribution of the inﬂation forecast of 12th
December 2000 (last traded prices). We have one observation for each contract
that is represented by its class middle (respective the class bound).
A ﬁrst inspection of the histogram suggests that inﬂation expectations might be
normally distributed. When extending the inspection to a larger number of days at
diﬀerent points in time during the market period this suggestion is substantiated.
Because of the relatively low number of observations we are not able to test this
hypothesis formally.
If in fact the market forecast is normally distributed - and that is what we
will assume in the following - we are able to make more precise statements about
the probability of diﬀerent inﬂation scenarios. Since we know the mean and the
standard deviation of the forecast we can calculate and graph the cumulative proba-
bility function (compare the example of 12th December 2000 that is shown in ﬁgure


















































Figure 9: Distribution of inﬂation forecast on 12th December 2000
we show the density functions on diﬀerent days during the market period.25
25Recently authors like Blix and Sellin (1999) and Wallis (1999) supposed inﬂation scenarios
often to be distributed asymmetrically. It should be noted that the market data also allow to




































































Figure 11: Density functions for market inﬂation forecast on selected dates
266.1 Application I: Calculation of the probability of inﬂation
scenarios, no contract is traded for
The knowledge about the density functions enables us to calculate the probability
for every inﬂation scenario that might be of interest, even if no contract in the
market was traded for the referring interval. To show this we use the data of 12th
December 2000 that correspond to the histogram in ﬁgure 9. Let us assume that
we would like to know on 12th December 2000 the probability for the scenario that
the inﬂation rate in February 2001 falls into the interval of 1,25% and 2,25%. Since
there is no contract for this scenario we can not assess this probability directly
from the market prices - even not by simply summing up the probabilities for two
or more intervals.26 The mean of inﬂation expectations on 12th December 2000
was 2,229% and the standard deviation of inﬂation expectations turned out to be
0,42265. Let f(Ij¹;¾2) be the density function of inﬂation expectations I with
mean ¹ and variance ¾2. Thus we can calculate the probability for the speciﬁed
scenario as


















dI ¼ 0;5198 ¡ 0;0103 = 0;5095:
6.2 Application II: Calculation of conﬁdence intervals and
modiﬁed fan charts
One might also be interested to calculate a conﬁdence-interval for the February
inﬂation rate. Since we assumed a symmetric distribution, the conﬁdence-interval
has to be symmetric around the mean of the distribution and can be calculated
quite easily. Let ® be the conﬁdence level we are interested in. We know that the
lower bound Il of the conﬁdence-interval is the inﬂation rate for which
Z ¹
Il
f(I)dI = 0;5 ¡
®
2
is fulﬁlled. Similarly the upper bound of the conﬁdence interval Iu has to fulﬁll the
condition Z Iu
¹




Again we shall illustrate the argument by giving an example. We will therefore
assume that we are interested in the 95%-conﬁdence-interval for the February in-
ﬂation rate on the basis of the market data of 12th December 2000. The upper
bound is the 97,5%-quantile of the speciﬁed normal distribution:
Iu = 3;057%:
26Note that the probability of inﬂation scenarios, a contract is traded for, is already known and
that we need no assumption on the empirical distribution of the forecast to assess this probability.
27Since the distribution is symmetric the lower bound can easily be calculated as
¹ ¡ (Iu ¡ ¹) = 2 ¢ ¹ ¡ Iu = 1;401%:
Thus, the market judged the probability that the February inﬂation rate will be in
between 1,401% and 3,057% to be 0,95.
The Bank of England uses fan charts to present their inﬂation forecasts. These
fan charts include a graphical representation of conﬁdence intervals for inﬂation at
diﬀerent times in the future. Since our prototype market generates a time series
of forecasts for one certain future date, only, we would need several markets to
reproduce such a fan chart. To produce a modiﬁed version of a fan chart we
calculate the conﬁdence intervals for diﬀerent ®-levels and for diﬀerent forecasting
dates (compare ﬁgure 12). Thus we receive some graphical representation of how
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Figure 12: Fan chart for the February 2001 inﬂation rate
7 Discussion of the prototype market’s design
and its results
After presenting some basic results from the prototype market we will turn to a
discussion of the market’s results and its design.
28It seems to be reasonable to start out with a discussion of the market’s mean
inﬂation forecast quality. Even if the market proved to work well from a technical
point of view the mean inﬂation forecast of the market was not highly accurate.
As it was shown earlier, the traders underestimated the February inﬂation rate
systematically, a phenomenon that was often observed within inﬂation expecta-
tion surveys during times of rising inﬂation.27 This result is obviously violating
the unbiasedness property of rational expectations which requires the expectation
errors to have zero means. Thus a series of forecasts can be called ,,rational”
whenever the expectation errors ﬂuctuate around the true inﬂation rate. Even if
it is desirable to have forecasts fulﬁlling the properties of rational expectations we
should note that the most time series of inﬂation forecasts are not satisfying these
conditions.28 Thus the failure to exhibit a ,,rational” forecast pattern does not
necessarily mean that an inﬂation market produces worse forecasting results than
conventional forecasting methods. To be able judge whether electronic markets are
a useful method of forecasting macroeconomic variables more forecasting markets
have to be organized.
Nevertheless it seems to be reasonable to think about how to improve the fore-
casting quality of future inﬂation forecasting markets. As it was pointed out earlier
it is very important that all important information on future inﬂation is present
at least somewhere in the market. The fact that our prototype market included
a relatively low number of 44 traders might be an explaining factor for the low
degree of accuracy of the market forecast. Possibly even more important is the
fact that nearly all traders were students from two university courses. Since taking
part in the market increased the probability of passing the courses’ ﬁnal exami-
nations (that also included questions on the functioning of electronic markets) at
least some of the traders might have had somewhat disturbed incentives to take
part. Therefore, the basic advantage of electronic markets to have traders only, who
suppose to have superior information on the event to be forecasted, was obviously
not given in the prototype market. Thus it might be supposed that inﬂation mar-
ket’s forecasting quality can be increased by advertising the market to a broader
public audience and especially not to run such a market as a mandatory part of an
university course.
An important and still unresolved question is what is the optimal number of
contract types that should be traded in the market. On the one hand the accuracy
of the market forecast obviously increases with an increasing number of contract
types traded. This is due to the fact that we use the class middles to calculate
the mean inﬂation forecast, thereby assuming that all possible outcomes in the
interval are equally likely. The forecasting errors caused by using this procedure
can be supposed to decrease when using smaller intervals for the contracts. On the
other hand the traders’ problem of determining the fair prices for the contracts can
be supposed to be positively correlated to the number of traded contracts. Up to
27Croushore (1996).
28Compare e.g. Gramlich (1983), Pearce (1979) and Laubscher and Schombee (1999), p. 10.
29now there is little evidence which number of contracts solves this trade-oﬀ in an
optimal way. A good strategy might be to start out with a relatively low number
of contracts and then to split those contracts which turn out to be traded for the
highest prices to increase the forecast’s quality.
As it was pointed out earlier, electronic markets can be used to predict any
future event that is measurable objectively. Nevertheless we should underline that
electronic markets are better suited to short run forecasts than to long run predic-
tions. This is due to the fact that the markets can not be liquidated before the
event, the market is conducted on, has taken place. Technically it is no problem to
run a long term forecast market. Such a forecast can be obtained from a market
that is run several years before the event of interest takes place. But it is obvious
that it will be hard to get traders for such a market because there is a long period
of time between trading and the liquidation of the market.
With respect to political stock markets critics often argue that electronic mar-
kets are no independent instruments because the traders in the markets would
simply reproduce the latest polls’ results. Even if some studies found a signiﬁ-
cant inﬂuence of polls on contract prices in political stock markets (compare e.g.
Br¨ uggelambert (1997) or Beckmann and Werding (1996)), recent results indicate
that traders in electronic markets do not simply reproduce poll results (compare
Berlemann and Schmidt (2001)). Nevertheless it is hard to judge whether the re-
sults of political stock markets would have been as accurate as they have been
when no polling information would have been at hand. This is due to the fact that
typically a large number of polls is conducted on the occasion of political elections.
It is somewhat easier to conduct electronic forecasting markets on macroeconomic
variables, no adequate forecast is available for. Doing so might help to answer the
question whether electronic markets are an independent forecasting instruments.
8 Summary and Outlook
In this paper we presented a new method to generate inﬂation forecasts via elec-
tronic markets. At the example of results from a class room experiment we demon-
strated how the market data of a well-deﬁned electronic market can be used to
forecast mean inﬂation as well as the probability of diﬀerent inﬂation scenarios at
low costs. The promising results from the prototype market make us believe that
the electronic market instrument is a useful forecasting device.
To learn more about the accuracy of electronic market forecasts a large number
of markets has to be conducted. To get well informed traders and to obtain a high
quality forecast it could be useful to advertise the markets via media partners as it
often has been done in political stock markets (note that it is not necessary to have
a somewhat representative sample of traders). Electronic markets could also be
used as an instrument to aggregate professional forecasters’ individual predictions
in a more reasonable and objective manner than it is often done within conventional
30consensus forecasts.
Up to now the most electronic markets were conducted in environments where
other forecasts on the market event were available. Thus it might be interesting to
set up markets in countries where no reliable forecasts of macroeconomic variables
exist. Currently ﬁrst attempts are undertaken to install a regular forecasting system
for inﬂation, unemployment and the exchange rate in Bulgaria.
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